Domestic Interests and China’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East

INTRODUCTION

What explains China’s behaviour in the Middle East? China’s policies in the Middle East are typically explained via its need for energy resources. The Middle East, particularly the oil-rich Gulf states, have been major suppliers of global oil resources. China’s energy needs have grown rapidly throughout the last few decades of swift industrialisation; it is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil. Since the turn of the century, China’s oil-seeking actions have earned much attention. Recently, however, concerns over Chinese behaviour have broadened to encapsulate different dimensions, including its increased assertiveness.

I argue that Chinese policies in the Middle East can be best understood as extensions of domestic needs. China’s internal fragmentation and domestic problems have informed much of its recent foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. While China has indeed paid much attention to energy security, both past and present, studies focused solely on its energy resource interests provide oversimplified explanations of China’s behaviour in the Middle East. They fail to consider how the variety of domestic interests within the Chinese state, and China’s resultant lack of economic and political unity, have impacted the state’s behaviour. This study reintroduces the internal fragmentation of the Chinese state as a driver of China’s energy policy in the Middle East. However, it does not consider the nuances of China’s bilateral relations with individual Gulf states, given the region’s variation and complexity.

CHINA'S "PRAGMATIC" ENERGY INTERESTS

China’s interest in improving its energy security needs little introduction. Its “diligent pursuit” of its apparent primary objective in the Middle East - oil - has garnered much interest from academics and general policy commentators alike. (1) As the country has pursued a fossil fuel-centric industrialisation pathway, its growing demand for energy has created a growing interest in energy security despite a recent, limited shift away from fossil fuel centricity. Regardless, China needs to continue ensuring a steady supply of oil imports to maintain its economic growth. Most of this oil will be imported from the Middle East, given the region’s rich oil resources and strong track record in reliable oil production. (2) To this end, China established three major national oil companies (NOCs), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). These NOCs have since established ties with various Middle Eastern states, particularly with the oil-rich countries of the Gulf: Iran and Saudi Arabia.

As a major importer and consumer of energy resources, China’s heightened demand for energy has significant geopolitical impacts. (3) The acceleration of China’s growth in energy consumption, given the sheer size of its urban population and its pace of economic growth, has led to a disproportionately large effect on global consumption and production patterns. By the early 2000s, China’s was identified as a potential major competitor in the dynamics of Middle Eastern energy geopolitics.

Interestingly, other commentators do not perceive Chinese interests in the Middle East as a threatening force for the region itself, American interests notwithstanding. Historically, China has been characterised as a relatively peaceful power in the Middle East; some observers note that the Middle Eastern states had perceived China as a nonimperial power, chiefly motivated by commercial interests. (4) “Hegemony, domination, and imperialism are associated with the United States and Europe. China is not seen that way.” (5) Chinese interests, chiefly characterised as oil-centric, were not seen to be a particularly destabilising force. By taking a non-threatening position, China has allowed mutual differences between itself and the Gulf states to be abandoned in interest of economic gains on both ends.

PROBLEMS WITH ENERGY-FIRST ONLY ANALYSIS

The proposition that China is in the Middle East to access energy resources tends to assume a “zero-sum” view of its position in the region. It consequently overemphasises the importance of oil in Chinese foreign policy in the region. (6) This form of analysis is limiting, and such a view does not demonstrate the full range of China’s foreign policy for the Middle East.

If, as the commonly held logic suggests, “Chinese foreign policy were really as focused on energy supply”, then “China’s votes and other stances within the UN should be a reflection” of this consideration, but the empirical evidence has not reflected this. (7) Instead, it has displayed other foreign policy preferences, such as its commitment to “the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention”. (8) China supported the United States in its 2001 War in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. It also “acquiesced” to the American position in the 2003 Iraq War. (9) If China was truly driven solely by oil interests at the time, it might have provoked the US for oil. (10) Instead, China deliberately avoided active, direct conflict over the energy supply with the US in the Middle East, and more broadly, the MENA region. (11) It thus became an “unlikely winner” of the 2003 Iraq War, where the CNPC was able to secure major oil contract gains. (12) Overall, China generally played by existing rules set by major powers in securing oil supplies and had not sought to revise local power balances.

The singular focus on China’s interest in energy, thus, obstructs a more thorough examination of China's broader position in the Middle East. Some of China’s foreign policy positions in the Middle East cannot be explained by the energy factor, even accounting for the country’s increasingly assertive stance in recent years.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES

Instead, a consideration of China’s domestic policy priorities reveals more complex dynamics in shaping its foreign policy. China has been described as increasingly fragmented domestically, where there is reduced clarity in ascertaining future pathways for economic development. (13) Thus, oil-as-energy might not be the chief concern of Chinese presence in the region. Rather, China might be seeking to address the environmental and technological facets of its domestic economic issues. Here, Israel-China relations provide an interesting case study. Even though Israel might be considered a close American ally; and China previously avoided competing directly with American interests in the Middle East, it would seem that there has been a shift in such a stance. Currently, China has extensive economic and even security linkages with Israel on a wide variety of issues, including on water treatment and environmental matters.

Such cooperation is likely due to a need to address the negative externalities generated by development, where the environmental costs to the Chinese public have been immense. For instance, the nationwide chronic shortage of water supplies, worsened by pollution; and China’s drastic measures to address the issue, are well-documented. One of the state’s most notable efforts is the South-North Water Diversion Project. It imposes high costs, both financially and politically: the diversion essentially reduces scarce water supplies for southern regions like Henan, which are implied to be less important than the capital. (14)

China’s recent behaviour can be also explained in terms of nationalistic appeals. One consequence of internal fragmentation might be stronger statist appeals to nationalism. Nationalism might present a fairly compelling mobilization platform to counter fragmentation. However, recent nationalism differs from older variants of Chinese nationalism, which had painted China a victimised state seeking recompense. Presently, China practices a brand of nationalism that appeals to the country’s history as a strongman state.

China’s increasing demonstrations of independent policy behaviour in the Middle East can be interpreted as aligning with the state’s recent rhetoric that appeals to a nationalist narrative. Xi Jinping’s administration has portrayed him as a leader of a great revival, one that draws on centuries-old historic traditions. (15) Given this assertive domestic rhetoric, the country’s foreign posture must then reflect a similar position. China’s posture on the international stage, thus, cannot appear weak. The country’s increased assertiveness in the Middle East, which is not even an area of contention charged with domestic nationalist sentiment, like Taiwan and the South China Sea, may be reflecting these imperatives

Another connection can be made between the terminology of revival, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects being implemented globally, including in the Middle East. The official name for the BRI references the historical “Silk Road” trade route 21 (sichou zhi lu jingji dai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhilu). The Silk Road was a centuries-long network of trade routes between China and the Mediterranean, stretching across the Middle East. It has been credited for the development of civilisational powers along the Silk Road. The naming choice evokes the greatness of a more primordial, historical Chinese civilisation’s: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might thus claim itself as a successor state to previous Chinese dynasties. The nationalist narrative argues that China had previously boasted years of historical civilisational prestige (which must be restored). (16) The BRI has been incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, possibly signifying that the BRI-related regions (including the Middle East) have become an area of core interest. While the actual text signals that this incorporation was likely a chiefly economic move, I maintain that it is possible to consider BRI-related actions as also appealing to domestic nationalistic zeal.

Although this piece will not attempt to assess whether the BRI policy has been implemented under less charitable intentions - arguments that the BRI was designed to put countries in a debt trap and hence become subservient to Chinese interests - the expensive infrastructure project is nonetheless a testament to China’s international ambitions. Again, such ambitions can be reflective of its larger quest for domestic and international prestige. At a time where the country’s debt levels far exceed its gross domestic product, one might wonder whether such expenditure is economically rational. (17) Nevertheless, I recognise that nationalism provides a more persuasive explanation for certain projects and policies, but not others. China’s assertiveness or independence may not necessarily always be compellingly attributed to nationalism. Still at a juncture of apparent internal fragmentation, some of its foreign policy posturing might be motivated by a need to perform and cohere support from domestic audiences.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this piece aims to have accomplished two main objectives. Firstly, it sought to demonstrate that a conventional focus on China’s energy policy might be myopic, and insufficient for explaining Chinese behaviour in the Middle East. Next, I argued that China’s foreign policy in the Middle East might be more reflective of domestic issues; subsequent formulations of foreign policy also aimed to address domestic problems. Thus, a study of domestic concerns is perhaps more illuminative of China’s behaviour in the Middle East, highlighting some less publicly ostensible priorities and dynamics.

Xinyi is a final year double degree undergraduate student at the National University of Singapore and Waseda University. She specialises in political science and has an interest in Chinese foreign policy. She will be working for the Singapore government after finishing her undergraduate studies.

REFERENCES

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2. Olimat. China and the Middle East. 39. 41.
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4. Olimat. China and the Middle East. 28.
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6. Frazier. ‘China’s Domestic Policy Fragmentation and “Grand” Strategy in Global Politics’. 96.
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11. Ibid.
12. 11 Afshin Molavi. ‘The New Silk Road. “Chindia.” and the Geo-Economic Ties That Bind the Middle East and Asia’, in China and the Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States, ed. Bryce Wakefield and Susan L. Levenstein. 2011. 52; Erica Downs. ‘China-Gulf Energy Relations’, in China and the Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States, ed. Bryce Wakefield and Susan E. Levenstein. 2011. 66.
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14. ‘A Canal Too Far’. The Economist, 27 September 2014. https://www.economist.com/china/2014/09/27/a-canal-too-far/.
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16. Zheng Wang. ‘Chosen Glory. Chosen Trauma’, in Never Forget National Humiliation (New York: Columbia University Press. 2012). 42-47.
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