Should US Forces Withdraw From Bases In East Asia?

INTRODUCTION

The US has over 800 military bases in more than 70 countries (Glaser, 2017). In the Asia Pacific area, there are 49 major bases and more than 154,000 active-duty military personnel, 330,000 if you include civilians (Glaser, 2017). US military capacities deployed in East Asia are made of five aircraft carrier strike groups, including as many as 180 ships and 1,500 air- craft, two-thirds of the Marine Corps’ combat strength, five Army Stryker brigades, and more than half of overall US naval strength (Glaser, 2017). Bases have 3 strategic justifications: deter adversaries, reassure allies, and enable rapid deployment operations (Glaser, 2017). US presence is also supposed to discourage nuclear proliferation and arms race in the region (Glaser, 2017).

This study analyzes the positive and negative impact of retreat of US military presence in Japan and South Korea. The retreat of its military presence would not mean that the US will stop providing security to East Asian countries, but simply end forward deployment by retreating its personnel, weapons and other military capacities (such as navy and air force) from Japan and South Korea.

I argue that the US should withdraw forces from bases in East Asia. The justification for this argument is that bases are currently not serving their strategic objectives (therefore are unnecessary to maintain US allies safe), and withdrawal will lead to positive impacts for the US and East Asian countries, namely Japan xand South Korea, such as reduced cost and reduced insecurity. I first describe the theoretical framework the argument originates from, then discuss the grounds that support US withdrawal, and finally address possible concerns arising from US withdrawal from the region.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Protests to bases abroad fall within three categories:

1. Ideological, which oppose bases on philosophical or policy grounds;
2. Nationalistic, which criticize bases primarily on cultural grounds, such as the perceived violence they impose on national sovereignty; and
3. Pragmatic, which object bases because of the way they function (Calder, 2007).

It is important to state which theoretical framework the essay operates in to understand the perspectives and arguments this study engages with. It presents ideological protests, arguing that bases are ineffective from a public policy perspective, and pragmatic protests, arguing that the way bases function leads to increased dangers for both the US and East Asian countries. The rationale for adopting these two frameworks is that they apply to the countries at hand. Because of these reasons, pragmatic and ideological frameworks allow for specific analysis of the country's specifics. Using nationalistic arguments enlarges the discussion into topics such as post-colonialism and regime transition which are beyond the scope of the study (Calder, 2007). Therefore, this essay examines the lack of necessity of forward deployed bases and the positive impacts of withdrawal from the perspective of policy convenience and local sentiments.

BASES IN EAST ASIA NOT NECESSARY

The first justification for the withdrawal argument is that bases in East Asia do not serve the strategic purpose for which they were constructed originally. During the Cold War, forward deployed bases to ensure US presence in allied countries and hot spots were created in order to enable rapid deployment, deter adversaries, and reassure allies, which in turn also serves as incentive to avoid nuclear proliferation and de-escalate the arms race (Glaser, 2017). However, current global trends and dynamics specific to the region analyzed make bases unnecessary from a policy point of view.

In the case of rapid deployment, technological developments, which have reduced travel times and increased strike precision, render bases abroad unnecessary. For instance, the US is capable of delivering non-fueled missions of up to 8,800 miles through their long-range bombers (Glaser, 2017). That is over double the distance between the bases in Guam and US’ allies adversaries in Asia, namely China and North Korea. Currently, B-1 and B-2 bombers can operate in East Asia flying from Guam, and satellites can take over the role of target acquisition from forward-deployed radars (Fatton, 2018).

The US’ ability to carry air-strikes over long distances is not a novelty. In fact, during the Gulf War in 1991 the US engaged in bombings in Iraq from bases on continental US, deploying B-52 warplanes in round trips that exceeded 10,000 miles and took only 30 hours (Glaser, 2017). In 2001, the US used B-2 stealth bombers from Missouri in Afghanistan. Now, tanker refueling, and by proxy airpower that relies on fuel, can extend “almost indefinitely” (Glaser, 2017). Because of these reasons, former US Air Force official Christopher Bowie stated that the US does not need bases in theater given its capacity to conduct paralyzing and disarming attacks from the US, and the National Defense Panel stated the US has capacity to attack within hours or days anywhere in the world from continental US (in Calder, 2007). In addition, unmanned bombers such as the Predator (rolled into a C-130 aircraft) and the Global Hawk, can now be deployed across Atlantic distances. In 2001, the Hawk set a world record for UAV endurance by flying 7,500 miles nonstop across the Pacific to Australia and has a speed of 400 miles per hour (Calder, 2007). This means it takes around 8 hours for the Hawk to reach North Korea from Guam. Hence, given the new war technologies owned by the US, forward deployed bases are not necessary in order to have rapid deployment, because even in the case of conflict the US has capacity to support its allies in a matter of hours from bases located on US territory.

The second strategic justification for forward deployed bases is deterrence of adversaries, but bases in East Asia are not the major factor aiding deterrence. This is because the main deterrents of conflict are US and allies military superiority compared to their adversaries and enemies’ internal issues. For instance, an attack from North Korea is deterred by the military superiority of South Korea and the US, despite the North Korean army being larger than South Korea’s. North Korea is the 4th largest standing military with 1.5 million active personnel. In comparison, South Korea has 600,000 troops, with an additional 50,000 US personnel stationed in the country. North Korea also has larger military capacities, including 5,500 tanks and 2,200 infantry fighting vehicles compared to South Korea only owning 2,500 main battle tanks, 5,800 artillery pieces, 2,700 armored fighting vehicles (Tooth, 2017). This indicates that even with current US forward deployment, North Korea has a larger military and therefore US forces in terms of numbers alone do not operate as a deterrent. Given the lack of conflict so far, it is possible to infer that the main deterrent for North Korean attack is not US and South Korean military capacity exceeding North Korea’s, but instead North Korea’s military technological inferiority prevents the country from attacking. The North Korean navy and air force maintain largely technologically inferior models of aircraft and maritime patrol craft, mostly due to equipment largely being of Soviet origin (RAND, 2019). For instance, over half of the navy, the main asset of North Korea according to Tooth (2017), and the Air Force, can only be used in the case of invasion and therefore constitute defense rather than attack capabilities. The navy’s strength is also reduced by the need to have two separate navies which cannot meet due to lack of sea passage, and the Air Force technological limits reduce its strike accuracy.

Hence, military deterrence is not achieved by the presence of US forces in South Korea, but instead military inferiority. Because of these reasons, North Korea engages mostly in hybrid warfare, which involves different types of force applied in the same battlefield (Taisic, 2019). North Korea particularly excels in cyberattacks (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Even in this context, US forces on the ground do not serve as a deterrent against cyber-attacks, since South Korea and Japan are better suited to defend and retaliate against this type of warfare (RAND, 2019). As of now, South Korea has cyber superiority over North Korea (Bandow, 2021), indicating deterrence is provided by the capacities of allies rather than US forward deployed presence. The argument of military inferiority does not apply to China, but the deterrent capacity of the US, given its superior military assets overall, remains present even upon withdrawal of US forces from the region.

US bases do not currently serve as deterrent of nuclear warfare, but rather US nuclear capacities located in mainland US – which extend the nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea –act as a deterrent. Allies will remain under the US nuclear umbrella even upon withdrawal, and therefore nuclear deterrence does not undermine the argument that bases serve no deterrence scope.

A further reason which deters attack from adversaries is China’s and North Korea’s internal issues. In the case of North Korea, military capacities are mostly aimed at defending Kim’s regime from external intervention (Tooth, 2017). In the case of China, the country is aware of its need to grow economically in order for the CCP to maintain power, and it is aware that a conflict with US allies will hinder such growth (Layne, 2007). In addition, CCP spends more on internal security than external defense, which further deters China from attacking its neighbors (Kang and Ma, 2018). Therefore, it is not US presence in bases in the region that deters adversaries’ attacks, but instead it is the internal issues and military technology being inferior in China and North Korea that prevent an attack.

The third strategic scope of forward deployment is reassurance of allies, which also leads to avoidance of military and nuclear proliferation. However, the recent behavior by Japan and South Korea indicates that they are not reassured of US commitments by the presence of bases on their grounds. In Japan, the credibility of the US security commitments is weakening, and the situation worsened under the Trump administration (Fatton, 2018). As a result of this, Japan is trying to become more independent from the US in terms of defense when balancing against China and North Korea. The Ministry of Defense’s budget for fiscal year 2021, was $51 billion, growing for the ninth year in a row (Smith, 2021). This ranks Japan’s budget for military spending sixth in the 2021 ranking of 140 countries by the Global Firepower rating (Yamaguchi, 2021). This budget spending allowed Japan to acquire over 900 warplanes (48 destroyers, including eight Aegis missile-combating systems) and 20 submarines. That exceeds the individual forces of Britain, Germany and Italy (Yamaguchi, 2021). Modernization of Japan’s air defenses includes investment in 104 F-35 fighter jets, which makes Japan the largest user of American stealth fighters outside the U.S (Yamaguchi, 2021). Japan is also considering whether it needs offensive strike capabilities to meet North Korean threats (Smith, 2021). Further modernization of Japanese defense includes improvement of Japan’s early detection systems (Smith, 2021). Thanks to these capacities, Japan is currently ranked fifth globally in overall military power after the US, Russia, China and India (Yamaguchi, 2021). These trends indicate that not only is the US presence in Japan not reassuring to their allies, but also that it is ineffective in preventing militarization.

In the case of South Korea, 52% of the population believes that the US and South Korea have diverging security priorities (Dalton and Han, 2020). Because of these reasons, the majority (60%) of South Korean citizens support acquisition of nuclear weapons to independently face the North Korea threat (Dalton and Han, 2020). This trend, which shows that military presence does not serve as reassurance and does not prevent nuclear proliferation, has also been witnessed in other US allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Israel (Glaser, 2017).

POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF WITHDRAWAL FOR THE US

Since US bases serve no strategic purpose in East Asia, forces should withdraw from the region given the positive impacts upon withdrawal. This argument takes from the theoretical argument of “Fortress America”, which argues that withdrawal of forces abroad is possible for the US since safety in the current international system is provided by technology, globalization of economic markets and geopolitical developments (Calder, 2007). The supporters of this argument argue that withdrawal is necessary for the US in order to become more secure. Instead of forward deployment, the US should focus on reinforcing robust nuclear, naval, and long- range aerospace capabilities, and leveraging its global influence through an “offshore-balancing” strategy (Calder, 2007). This argument finds strong support given that it aligns with domestic interests within the US, such as reducing spending, focus on national security and lessened foreign battle casualties (Calder, 2007). This section is going to argue that the US derives three positive outcomes from withdrawal:

1. Reduced vulnerability to personnel abroad,
2. Reduced risk of war through entanglement, and
3. Reduced costs.

REDUCED VULNERABILITY

First, having forward deployment endangers US citizens deployed to said basis. The development of intermediate and long range ballistic missiles makes overseas bases susceptible to asymmetric attacks which are very difficult to defend against (Glaser, 2017). For instance, China has invested in these capabilities, such as the theater-strike system DF-21. This weapon makes more than 90% of US air facilities in East Asia vulnerable (Glaser, 2017). In addition, China’s SS-9s and North Korea’s mobile Nodong can incapacitate aircraft carriers and devastate ground forces in Japan, South Korea and the Middle East (Calder, 2007). Therefore, withdrawing US forces deployed in East Asia has the positive impact of increasing security of US citizens by reducing the chances of casualties. Relocation of US forces from Oikinawa to Haiwaii and Guam is already happening as a result of Chinese development of ballistic and cruise missiles (Fatton, 2018). Withdrawal from East Asia will allow to relocate troops at home, which is necessary given the growing threat on the US mainland caused by North Korea's long range missiles (including ICBMs).

REDUCED RISK OF WAR THROUGH ENTANGLEMENT

Glaser (2017) argues that US presence encourages its allies to act more boldly, which can cause escalation of conflict. For instance, the Philippines’ behavior in 2012 in South China would have de-escalated if it was not for US support (Glaser, 2017). There is currently risk of entanglement in East Asia over the territorial claims between China and Japan over the Senkaku andDiaoyu islands, where the US has no geopolitical interest but has promised to aid Japan in case of conflict (Fatton, 2018). In the case of North Korea, a study by Rich (2018) found that the US entanglement in defence of South Korea is only supported insofar as there are no US casualties. Hence, forward deployed bases lead to the risk of war through entanglement, so withdrawal has the positive impact of avoiding casualties and appeasing public opinion.

REDUCED COST

Finally, withdrawal of US forces leads to reduced costs for the US. It costs an average of $10,000–$40,000 per year to station a single member of the military outside the US in areas that are not at war (Glaser, 2017). The annual cost for a single overseas base, without considering personnel, transport, equipment and operational costs, is between 50 million to $200 million per year (Glaser, 2017). The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that US military presence in the Asia-Pacific accounts for more than double the total spending for overseas bases, accounting around $12 billion per year, excluding expenditures for equipment or US Naval fleet operations (Glaser, 2017). The overall cost for bases in the Asia pacific is over $44 billion annually (Glaser, 2017). In addition, as pointed out by Calder (2007), these are the costs for current forward deployment, costs that will soar if the region transitions into active warfare, like in the cases of Iraq and Vietnam. In fact, the Iraq war alone cost over half a trillion dollars, a cost that will be much higher in the case of confrontation with China given the economic ties with the US. Therefore, by withdrawing US forces from East Asia, the US will earn over $44 billion annually, which can be repurposed in homeland security, such as anti-terrorism and cybersecurity activities, both of which are higher threats to US security compared to the geopolitical issues in East Asia.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF WITHDRAWAL FOR SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN

Similar to the US, Japan and South Korea will reap positive benefits from US withdrawal in terms of security, cost and public opinion.

First, withdrawal can lessen the security dilemma in the region. Glaser (2017) and Calder (2007) argue that US military bases not only do not serve their purpose of deterrence, but also exacerbate international tensions by causing fear and encouraging adversaries to counterbalance. Because of this, US presence can antagonize otherwise docile adversaries. For instance, US naval presence in the region exacerbated tensions with China. Because roughly 40 percent of China’s seaborne oil imports pass through sea-lanes and critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca (which are subject to interdiction by the United States), China is encouraged to act more aggressively over its maritime claims (Glaser, 2017). In addition, US presence in the region can lead, in the case of conflict, to US collateral damage which in turn worsens regional security overall (RAND, 2019).

Furthermore, US policy involving regime change and democratic establishment can drag countries into otherwise avoidable wars (Layne, 2007). This is particularly evident in the case of nuclear proliferation by North Korea, as US presence pressures the country to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to protect the regime from US interference. The same applies to China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964. In addition, US presence in the area corners adversaries, increasing the chances of an irrational desperate attack through nuclear weapons (Glaser, 2017).

Second, US withdrawal from the region encourages allies to self-defend, which increases their security status overall. Bandow (2021) and Glaser (2017), argue that South Korean superiority compared to North Korea in terms of population and economy permit the country to construct a military stronger than their neighbors, so there is no need for South Korea to accept military inferiority. However, South Korea’s reliance on US security deters it from strengthening its own military capabilities (Bandow, 2021). This makes South Korea vulnerable in the case of a crisis, where the US puts their priorities forward. For instance, given North Korean capacity to reach continental US with their long-range weapons, the US will prioritize homeland security over protection of allies in foreign territories. By withdrawing forces from bases in East Asia, as it was stated in a 2011 bipartisan letter aimed at reducing forward deployment, the US will be better prepared to meet its security commitments to allied countries and its own citizens in case of warfare (Glaser, 2017). In addition, the presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea, and the US unwillingness to station nuclear weapons in their allies territories (Dalton and Han, 2020) fails to reassure its allies that in the case of a crisis support will be provided. Differently from Japan, South Korea’s hedging and establishment of its own security is less evident. Hence, withdrawal of US forces encourages South Korea to better provide for its own security, which will also cover a crisis situation where US commitment is not certain.

With regards to costs, Japan and South Korea pay $60 million and $290 million, respectively, for maintaining US troops in their countries (Hosokowa, 1998). Furthermore, it is estimated that bases cost Japan $5 billion in total, and the Trump administration required South Korea to increase their economic burden sharing to $5 billion in early 2019 (Hosokowa, 1998 ; Dalton and Han, 2020). This economic burden negatively affects public opinion in both countries, with Japan having 67% of public opinion in favor of a reduction in the number of US military bases, and 68% of respondents surveyed in South Korea demanding re-negotiation of costs. Negative public opinion in the countries is not only due to the economic burden placed by foreign troops on their grounds, but also by societal reasons. Calder (2007) explains that the contact hypothesis states that protests against bases are going to be higher in places where there is intense and frequent exchange between base inhabitants and the general community. These tensions depend both on the quantity of military stationed in the bases, and population density of the locality the base is placed. For instance, countries with high population densities, such as South Korea, and high local population concentrations, such as the environments of Seoul, will tend to have relatively contentious patterns of base politics compared to less populated areas (Calder, 2007).

In the case of Japan, most of the base protests take place in Okinawa, which is densely populated and where most of the 50,000 US troops stationed in the territory are (Calder, 2007). Tensions are lower in Iwate Prefecture (Misawa), in the northeast, and Sasebo in the southwest (Calder, 2007), even though they are geographically closer to North Korea and the Taiwan Straits respectively, and therefore are easily vulnerable to retaliation by an adversary. Therefore, in the case of US troops stationed abroad, it is the presence of troops itself, not danger and predicted casualties, that lowers public opinion. This is partly understandable in the case of Okinawa given the link between military presence and crime. In fact, between 1972 and 2011, the prefectural government documented more than a thousand violent crimes, and over 5 thousands non-violent crimes, committed by US militaries in the region (Glaser, 2017).

Negative public opinion is not only a political incentive for South Korea and Japan to seek US withdrawal from bases on their territory, but it is also a security concern. In fact, as base politics becomes more tense, US commitment to their allies becomes more complicated and therefore tensions surrounding forward deployed bases undermine the security of Japan and South Korea. Because of these reasons, East Asian countries will benefit from a withdrawal of US forward deployed forces.

ADDRESSING CONCERNS

There are security, geopolitical and diplomatic concerns regarding withdrawal of US troops from East Asia. This section explores these concerns and argues that weighing them against the gains the US and East Asian countries obtain from withdrawal, withdrawal should happen.

Security concerns arising from a possible attack on US allies by North Korea or China have been addressed throughout the essay. Even in the case of US forces withdrawal from East Asia, the US will keep on providing security with its allies, as it is capable of quickly deploying military capacities in a short time across long distances. In the case of a nuclear attack, allies will still be protected by the US nuclear umbrella. In addition, Japan and South Korea, given their current military capabilities, are able to defend themselves in the short term.

However, further security concerns arise from the possible tension created by Japan militarization. Hosokawa (1998) stated Japan has no reason to challenge the status quo, but withdrawal of US forces can be interpreted by China as an incentive for Japanese militarization and imperialism. Although Japanese militarization has security policy reasons at its root, it can be interpreted by its neighbors as Japan turning into a military power, which can in turn accelerate the arms race (Yamaguchi, 2021). Because of these reasons, China, although irrationally, could find itself more threatened by US withdrawal than US presence in East Asia.

Despite this, it is important to note that, since the US is already not reassuring enough for its allies, Japan has been militarizing even with US presence within its borders. Hence, US presence cannot be seen as a deterrent for Japanese militarization, and US withdrawal will not worsen the security dilemma. Instead, US presence in Japan encourages militarization to increase burden sharing in security provision, especially in the case of improvement of ballistic missile defenses (Smith, 2021). Because of these reasons, US withdrawal will not worsen the security dilemma between China and Japan, but rather de-escalate the situation.

The argument of US withdrawal also raises geopolitical concerns regarding trade in the region. Glaser (2017) and Calder (2007) recognize the importance of forward deployed basis in order to ensure access to resources and free passage of maritime trade. However, this argument is applicable to the US presence in the Middle East, but less relevant to East Asian bases. In fact, US military presence in Korea and its security commitment to Taiwan, are not major factors in the balance of power or in US protection of shipping lanes and can be relinquished at little cost to US security (Glaser, 2017). In addition, the burden of protecting maritime commercial lanes surrounding Japan is assigned to its own navy (Hosokowa, 1998), despite it being one major security concern for Japan, as Beijing’s assertive behavior in the region threatens 95% of Japan energy supplies and 40% of its maritime trade (Fatton, 2018). Hence, geopolitical security of maritime trade will not be highly influenced by US forces withdrawal from Japan and South Korea given US forces currently have little impact on the matter.

A final concern arises from diplomacy, as it is argued US withdrawal from East Asia threatens US primacy and serves as a military victory for China.

According to a Pentagon memo in 1992, forward-deployed military presence serves the core objective of discouraging enemies from seeking a greater role in international relations and maintaining US primacy (in Glaser, 2017). They allow for the US to act a benevolent hegemon in the international system by providing security to allies whilst ensuring its own objectives are met.

However, this is currently unnecessary. First of all, compared to the Cold war when the bases were established, currently US primacy is unchallenged. US superiority is not only quantitative in terms of GDP and military strength, but also qualitative given its technological assets and soft power (Layne, 2007). Kang and Ma (2018) argue that foreign actors, such as China, do not challenge US primacy as much as internal issues, and therefore repurposing of funds used for forward deployed forces into domestic issues can aid maintenance of hegemony more than US troops presence abroad.

In addition, primacy is not a strategic objective which is enough to counterbalance the risks and costs of forward deployed forces (Glaser, 2017). And even if it was more strategically important, primacy need not be achieved through forward deployment, as America’s soft power allows for the country to avoid reaching out to allies, because allies already are provided with strong incentives to conform to US will. Instead, forward deployment can undermine said incentives, as it can be seen as an imposition of the American empire rather than voluntary submission (Calder, 2007). For instance, the 2003 US military involvement in Iraq, which was both costly and politically contented, weakened and will continue to weaken US soft power and hegemony in the foreseeable future (Calder, 2007). Therefore, primacy is less strategically important compared to cost and security and US hegemony is weakened by forward deployment, making withdrawal of forces will be beneficial in terms of maintaining primacy.

US withdrawal might be interpreted as a loss for the US, which gives China the chance of claiming this as a diplomatic victory. However, China claims its diplomacy operates in win-win terms, rather than zero-sum game, meaning a loss for the US does not equal a win for China (Jiang, 2017). A change of narrative would not be beneficial for the CCP, as the positive narrative of China’s strength is normatively stronger than a narrative of US weakness (Betz and Phillips, 2017). Even in the occurrence this is seen as a victory for China, it can at best aid the CCP domestic support, but will have little impact in the international theater. Even considering security concerns surrounding Taiwan, US commitment can continue in the same way it continues for Japan and South Korea. Hence, the diplomatic loss the US will partially suffer from withdrawing is much smaller than the one it will suffer from keeping forward deployed forces.

CONCLUSION

US forces in East Asia are currently not serving their strategic objectives of enemy deterrence, reassurance of allies and rapid deployment. The security and economic benefits the countries involved derive from US withdrawal are higher than the downsides, making the argument for withdrawal a stronger one in terms of both ideological and pragmatic terms. Therefore, the US should withdraw forward deployed forces from Japan and South Korea.

Livia Sapochetti is a second year MPP/IP student at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy. Her research interests focus on demilitarisation, non-military security and nonviolent civilian protection.

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